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Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta economías emergentes. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta economías emergentes. Mostrar todas las entradas

martes, 9 de junio de 2015

La importancia de la economía informal

https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/06/why-we-need-to-rethink-the-informal-economy/?utm_content=buffer5425a&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

Why we need to rethink the informal economy

‘Informality’ troubles policymakers in developing countries because it is seen as being associated with low productivity and poverty. Cross-sectional differences in rates of informality do seem to suggest that development is associated with declining informality (see Figure 1). And yet, despite these expectations, informality as conventionally measured has been exceptionally persistent (Figure 2). This seems to go against the basic predictions of development economics. If informality is the ‘problem’ and growth the solution, what is one to do when growth doesn’t seem to be solving the problem? Should one make direct attempts at reducing informality?
Figure 1. Informal jobs in developing countries
150605-informal developing countries economies
Data source: OECD, 2009. World Development Indicators, 2010. ILO KILM.
Note: 52 countries with available data shown. Chart uses latest data on informal share of employment available (1995‐99 or 2000‐07). GDP per capita is in 2005 constant PPP international $.
Figure 2. Informal sectors are exceptionally persistent (share of population in informal employment, earliest and latest data points available)
Data source: ILO KILM Table 8, “Employment in the informal economy”. India: Annual Survey of Industries/National Sample Survey (Manufacturing only).
We think this is the wrong way to look at things. The key to policymaking towards informality is twofold. First, to specify more basic objectives, such as efficiency and equity, which transcend informality – informality and its persistence in itself is neither good nor bad. Second, to disaggregate informality into policy-relevant categories, rather than take it as an undifferentiated lump and then gauge policies by their impact on its magnitude.
There are many conceptual and statistical definitions of formality and informality, but one pole of consensus is that the distinction can be made only relative to some set of state regulations and laws (Guha-Khasnobis et al 2006, Kanbur 2015). Legal requirements on enterprises, to register, pay taxes, and provide certain benefits to their workers, are often a starting point in concept and in official statistics (ILO 2013). However, while ‘formality’ is unambiguously defined as falling within the ambit of a set of laws and complying with them, informality, defined as its complement, has at least three faces: Evaders, Avoiders, and Outsiders. Evaders are covered by the law but do not comply. Avoiders adjust so as to put themselves outside the remit of the law. Outsiders are those simply not covered by the law.
To make things concrete, suppose the law requires all enterprises with 10 or more workers to register and to provide certain benefits to workers. Then those enterprises which hire more than 9 workers and register will make up the formal sector. All other enterprises are therefore informal – but there are different types of informality. An evader would be an enterprise with 15 workers that doesn’t register. An avoider would be a firm that would have hired 11 workers without the regulation, but now chooses to hire only nine. An outsider would be an enterprise that in the absence of the law would have fewer than nine workers, which is simply unaffected by the legislation.
This is not a fanciful example. Registration of manufacturing enterprises employing 10 workers or more is a requirement of India’s Factories Act. Using two complementary data sources,1 Table 1 presents estimates of the numbers of enterprises and workers in each of the four categories: Formal (A), Evaders (B), Avoiders (C), and Outsiders (D). We assume that all nine-worker enterprises are avoiders, which overestimates category (A) and correspondingly underestimates category (D). The Table highlights some key empirical realities:
Table 1. Compliers, evaders, avoiders and outsiders under India’s Factories Act
Source: Chatterjee and Kanbur (2014).
  • Lower productivity in informal sector (categories (B), (C) and (D));
  • Small number of ‘avoiders’ or adjusters, at little more than one percent of all workers;
  • Significant enforcement problems, with around 10% of workers employed by evaders; and
  • A huge number of ‘outsiders’, at about 65% of the workforce.
To see why all this matters for policy, consider three dimensions of regulatory policy in this framework: the regulatory threshold, the cost to the firm of complying with the regulation, and the intensity with which it is enforced. It can be shown (under certain conditions) that:
  • Small changes in the regulatory threshold do not affect aggregate informality, only its composition between evaders, avoiders and outsiders – an increase, for instance, will induce some evaders to become avoiders (their loss from reducing sales now being smaller than the costs concealment) and slightly increase the number of outsiders;
  • Higher costs of regulation increase aggregate informality but, crucially, also change its composition; and
  • Higher enforcement intensity decreases total informality, but does so partly by increasing the amount of avoidance.
Clearly, focusing on the aggregate level of informality as a key indicator for prediction and for normative policy (the ‘reduce informality’ mantra) is problematic. The disaggregated composition of informality proves a better guide, and for policy it is best to focus firmly on the objective and the impact on it of each policy instrument.
Further, a major complaint of many NGOs is that the regulation issue is irrelevant for the vast majority of the informal sector – the outsiders. Evidently, their numbers and their outcomes are wholly unaffected by the costs of regulation and its enforcement. For them, a whole other set of policies are relevant and important, policies which will directly raise their productivity. Financial inclusion, and changing the practices of financial institutions which exclude them from financial services, becomes the key policy challenge.
The question of informality is prominent not only in discussions of labour and enterprise regulation, but in the policy discourse on taxation. Informality is almost always at or near the top of lists of tax challenges in developing countries. ‘Taxing the informal economy‘ leads the African Development Bank’s tax priorities, and ’reducing informality‘ is often seen as a central objective of tax reform. But here too this proves an inadequate guide for analysis and policy design (Kanbur and Keen 2015).
In so far as any precise meaning is given to the term in discussions of taxation, informality is usually taken simply to mean non-remittance of tax due – failure to pay. But there are all kinds of reasons why a firm or individual might pay no tax. Maybe they are simply below the threshold above which they are legally obliged to; or maybe they are evading. Might not why no tax is paid matter for policy making at least as much as the fact of it not being paid? And how should tax systems be structured when it is recognised that their design may affect not only how much tax is paid, but the different ways in which it is not paid? These questions lead, in our view, to a more useful strand of analysis than generalities about reducing informality.
Take for example the VAT. This typically has some threshold level of sales above which the enterprise must pay tax on all its sales, including those below the threshold (with credit for tax charged on its own purchases). In addition it faces some largely fixed compliance costs in remitting tax. Firms differ, suppose, in the maximum amount they can sell, though they can choose to sell less than that. They can also choose to remit less than the amount due on their true sales, but at some cost in terms of potential penalties (and maybe others too). A few reasonable assumptions then imply that firms fall into five categories, ranging from the smallest to the largest in pre-tax sales (Table 2) – four of these correspond to those above, with now an additional distinction between those who wholly or only partly evade.
Table 2. Partition of taxpayers
Source: Kanbur and Keen (2014).
Consider the policy problem of setting the tax threshold with the objective of improving social welfare, defined in the usual way as after-tax income plus government revenue weighted to reflect the marginal social value of tax revenue. We show that changing the threshold does not change measured aggregate informality or tax revenue; some simply flip between being adjusters and avoiders (Kanbur and Keen 2014). But it does change output (through the impact on those hovering below the threshold), and hence also affects welfare.
Juxtaposing labour regulation and tax raises the important but neglected question of how to think about informality when there are multiple sets of regulations, as is commonly the case. What is informality then? Informal relative to all obligations or to some? And how does optimal policy in one dimension of regulation depend on the situation in the other dimension? Kanbur and Keen (2014) show that answers to these questions are possible, but have little to do with ‘reducing informality’.
Use of the term informality is not going to end anytime soon. But it is important to be clear about the concept and its definition, especially in the context of policy. An aggregative notion and measure of informality captures some aspects of reality, but risks obscuring more than it reveals. Sensible policy in some cases already recognizes this – tax administrators, for instance, shape their actions not in terms of reducing informality but of tailored interventions across different categories of taxpayer, often segmenting them by size along much the same lines described above (IMF 215). It is in understanding and addressing the varieties of informality, not agonizing over some aggregate, that real progress can be made.
References
Guha-Khasnobis, B, R Kanbur and E Ostrom (eds) (2006), Linking the formal and informal economy: Concepts and policies, Oxford University Press, 2006.
Chatterjee, U and R Kanbur (2014), “Regulation and non-compliance: Magnitudes and patterns for India’s factories act”, Cornell Working Paper.
Ghani, E and R Kanbur (2014), “Urbanization and (in)formalization,” in E Glaeser and A Joshi-Ghani (Eds.) The urban imperative: Towards competitive cities, Oxford University Press.
ILO [RB6] (2013), Measuring informality: A statistical manual on the informal sector and informal employment (International Labour Organization, Geneva).
Kanbur, R (2015), “Informality: Causes, consequences and policy responses”, Paper prepared for Reserve Bank of India, CEPR Discussion Paper 10509.
Kanbur, R and M Keen (2015), “Reducing informality”, Finance and Development, 52(1).
Kanbur, R and M Keen (2014), “Thresholds, informality and partitions of compliance”, International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 21: pp. 536-559.
IMF (2015), “Current challenges in revenue mobilization: Improving compliance”, International Monetary Fund.

10 aspectos de la economía mexicana

https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/05/top-10-things-to-know-about-the-mexican-economy/?utm_content=buffer7cd58&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

Top 10 things to know about the Mexican economy

Today’s Mexico is large, diversified, and growing stronger.
Ahead of our World Economic Forum on Latin America 2015, which takes place in Riviera Maya, Mexico from 6-8 May, here’s what you need to know about the current state of the Mexican economy, in 10 facts and figures.
1) Mexico has a $1.26 trillion economy, making it the 15th largest economy in the world, and the 11th taking into account power purchasing parity. This makes Mexico a so-called “middle power”: falling just short of being a G7 economy, it is nevertheless an economic power to be reckoned with.
2) With its 122 million inhabitants, the GDP per capita currently stands at about$10,000, placing it firmly in the “upper middle income” countries. Adjusted for purchasing power, the GDP per capita is about 60% higher, at roughly $16,000. That puts it in the same league with countries like Turkey, Romania, and Brazil, but still far below countries like the U.S. ($55,000) or Switzerland ($58,000)
3) Economic growth is forecasted to rebound to 3.5% in 2015, more or less in line with compounded average annual growth in the years following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Before that, growth averaged about 4-5% per year. The country faced its last severe economic crisis in 1994.
4) Despite the positive forecasts, the Mexican economy faced a number of challenges in recent years. Growth was under 2% in 2013, and under 3% in 2014. The price of commodities, important for Mexico’s income from exports, has been falling in what has been called “the end of the commodity super cycle”.
5) The government of Enrique Peña Nieto, which came to power in December 2012, has been pressing ahead with what has been seen by many as an “ambitious reform agenda.” This includes an overhaul of the taxing system, cuts in government spending, and the liberalisation of certain economic sectors such as energy and telecommunications.
6) Mexico is traditionally seen as a commodities and manufacturing giant. It has the largest proven silver reserves in the world, and the tenth largest oil reserves. PEMEX, the state-owned oil company, is one of the largest oil producers in the world, with revenues of about $130 billion.
7) Due to rising wages and less favourable trade terms, Mexico recently gained competitiveness as a automobile exporter. Large automotive companies such as Volkswagen, Toyota, Nissan, Ford, General Motors and Fiat Chrysler have increased their production in Mexico recently, or have announced their intentions to do so.
8) Thanks to its membership of the North American Free Trade Association(NAFTA), Mexico has been able to become one of the United States’ largest trade partners. It exports mostly manufactured goods, industrial goods, and automobiles. It has a positive trade balance with the United States, and as a consequence, has become one of the largest holders of U.S. treasury bonds.
9) Mexico became the first Latin American country to enter the Organisation forEconomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1994. It was later joined by Chile. Colombia is in talks to join the OECD as well. The current president of the OECD is a Mexican, Jose Angel Gurria.
10) Mexico is the OECD country with the second highest degree of economic disparity between the rich and the poor, behind Chile. The bottom 10% on the income rung disposes of 1.36% of the country’s resources, whereas the upper 10% dispose of almost 36%. Twenty-six percent of GDP comes from the informal economy, a part of the economy in which almost 60% of the workforce is active.
The World Economic Forum on Latin America 2015 takes place in Riviera Maya, Mexico, from 6-8 May.
Author: Peter Vanham is Senior Media Manager at World Economic Forum. 
Image: New Ford vehicles are seen at a parking lot of the Ford factory in Sao Bernardo do Campo, Mexico. February 12, 2015. REUTERS/Paulo Whitaker

martes, 25 de febrero de 2014

Malas expectativas y más incertidumbre para los países "emergentes" y la economía mundial para el 2014


http://www.forbes.com.mx/sites/por-que-2014-sera-un-ano-diferente/

¿Por qué 2014 será un año diferente?

Ethan Michaly

Acerca de Ethan Michaly

Analista de mercados, banquero, trader y ex ejecutivo de bancos de inversion en los Estados Unidos.
Escrito por  en febrero 24, 2014
Foto: Reuters
Foto: Reuters
Precisamente los mercados emergentes ya están declinando en actividad económica, como consecuencia de la desaceleración del mundo desarrollado.

Desde la crisis de 2008-2009, hemos tenido una sorprendente recuperación económica de lo que fue un desastre comparable casi a la Gran Depresión, con la salvedad que se tomaron medidas que finalmente (o temporalmente) la evitaron.
Por supuesto, aquella recuperación económica y de los mercados no ha sido igual en todas las regiones. Europa ha tardado mucho más en salir de su crisis de lo que Estados Unidos y los mercados emergentes tuvieron un despegue estelar, ya que tenían los recursos, los ahorros y la mano de obra barata. Pero, por sobre todo, a un cliente garantizado (el mundo desarrollado) que lo único que sabe hacer bien es consumir.
Tratando de comprender el porqué de aquella recuperación casi ininterrumpida durante 5 años he tratado de explicar en innumerables ocasiones lo que, a mi parecer, ha sido el catalizador de aquel milagro económico: el aumento en la deuda de los países desarrollados para subsidiar y salvar al sistema, como también por la gran cantidad de dinero que se imprimió. Estamos inundados de dinero, pero el dinero es papel hoy en día con muy poco respaldo en activo real, he ahí el porqué del alza sostenida de los bienes: hay más dinero que bienes.
Pero la reacción económica a estas medidas ha empezado a mostrar signos de agotamiento en  algunos mercados y en algunas bolsas, y las herramientas disponibles ya fueron utilizadas, solo cabría prolongarlas o incluso redoblarlas para revertir la tendencia. La política monetaria y de deuda se ha estrechado a un nivel insostenible y cada vez resulta más oneroso seguir dándole vueltas a la misma rueda, la cual cada vez se pone más pesada y con ello lenta.
Muchas veces durante este periodo he mantenido que esta postura terminará siendo insostenible y cada año ha terminado resultando en una negación a mi creencia. Aun así, la sigo manteniendo. Y la pregunta del millón es si será cierto o no y, si lo es, cuando será. Pero no soy lo suficientemente inteligente para hacer aquella predicción, sólo estoy convencido de que sucederá, el cómo y cuándo, creo, no lo sabremos. Se preguntarán ustedes por qué tengo una convicción tan obstinada de que estas medidas terminarán no funcionando, y trataré de explicarlo de una forma muy simple: porque si todo se pudiera solucionar poniéndole más billetes al sistema y endeudándose indefinidamente, el mundo alcanzaría (al menos de un punto de vista económico y de mercados) el status de perfección eterna, o panacea. Esto los escribí hace tres años en un artículo que tenía como título “La fuente de la Juventud”. Sencillamente, las panaceas no existen. La dinámica de nuestro mundo perfecto y a la vez imperfecto lo impiden. La abundancia eterna no existe al menos en lo que se refiere al aspecto material, todos los recursos tienen un límite lamentablemente, de otro modo para que se necesita hablar de la palabra economía. Si los recursos son ilimitados, no se necesita la economía, aquella ciencia social viene basada en el estudio de cómo administrar los recursos escasos.
Ahora bien, el porqué del 2014 como un año diferente radica en que precisamente los mercados emergentes ya están declinando en actividad económica, como consecuencia de la desaceleración del mundo desarrollado, sumado al alza de tasas en dólares en los EEUU producto del “tapering”, y dado el hecho de que también aquellos mercados han tenido una cantidad de inversión de tal envergadura que el ritmo de ésta empieza a decrecer, y con ello el crecimiento de sus despectivos PIB. A aquello se suma el hecho de que su monedas han venido en general depreciándose, manteniendo con ello si bien una mayor competitividad del sector exportador, también un mayor costo en las importaciones y con ello una merma en el consumo. Al decrecer el ritmo de actividad en los mercados emergentes, se agota de alguna forma lo que ha sido el motor en parte industrial y en parte del consumo que sostuvo al menos temporalmente la economía global durante los últimos años.
Nos encontramos entonces a una situación diferente a la tendencia registrada y ahora el mundo en su globalidad entrará finalmente en una etapa de desaceleración. Si bien esto no significa necesariamente que precipite un cataclismo financiero, sí por lo menos habrá mucho mayor volatilidad y las bases estructurales volverán a una situación de tambaleo e incertidumbre. Estados Unidos no cuenta lamentablemente con la fuerza para arrastrar los vagones, mucho menos Europa y Japón. China por sí solo aun creciendo a tasas atractivas no es capaz de absorber la gran caída en la demanda agregada que registraremos.